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  Abstract: At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as 
intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also 
involving non-governmental organizations, citizen’s movements, 
multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Therefore it 
should be analyzed how corporate governance might affect global strategy 
and global organization, which in turn will shape the patterns of 
globalization. Also, it should be done a theoretical analysis regarding how 
each corporate governance actor (employees, shareholders, the board of 
directors, top management, teams and governments) will behave towards 
global strategy.  
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Introduction  
With the globalization of the world's capital markets, corporate governance has 
followed swiftly onto the world stage. Furthermore, global forces are shaping the 
continuing development of corporate governance, and institutional investors, with their 
expanding cross-market holdings, have become agents for change.  
The importance of corporate governance is hardly limited to Anglo-American 
markets. In fact, the investors share strong views on the value of corporate governance 
regardless of their region. The adoption of a common European currency, the freer flow 
of capital, goods, services and people across EU borders, and increased merger activity 
among large European companies have all created tremendous interest among European 
issuers and  investors, member states and the Commission in the shared aims, as well as 
the differences, in corporate governance practice across Europe (reflected in corporate 
governance codes) and also any related barriers to the development of a single EU 
financial market. 
 Globalizing forces exert a pull that shapes and accelerates the development of 
corporate governance in markets throughout the world. The introduction of corporate 
governance regulations and best practices in one country or region (such as the 
European Union) increasingly affects practices in markets far beyond those borders.  
Momentum is also global. For the majority of investors the corporate 
governance is more important today than it was three years ago and will become even 
more important in the next three years.  
At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental 
relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental 
organizations, citizen’s movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital 
market.   
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What Exactly Is Corporate Governance? 
Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and 
institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. 
Narrowly defines, corporate governance concerns the relationships among the many 
players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for which the corporation is governed. 
The principal players are the shareholders, management and the board of directors. 
Other stakeholders include employees, suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, 
regulators, the environment and the community at large. 
More broadly defined, corporate governance can encompass the combination of 
laws, regulations, listing rules and voluntary private sector practices that enable the 
corporation to:  
• attract capital; 
• perform efficiently; 
• achieve the corporate objective; 
• meet both legal obligations and general societal expectations. 
The Commission on Global Governance (United Nations) defines Global 
Governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs“. It is a continuing process through which 
conflicting or diverse interests may accommodate, and cooperative action may be taken. 
It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well 
as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive 
to be in their interest.  
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. An important theme of 
corporate governance deals with issues of accountability and fiduciary duty, essentially 
advocating the implementation of guidelines and mechanisms to ensure good behavior 
and protect shareholders. Another key focus is the economic efficiency view, through 
which the corporate governance system should aim to optimize economic results, with a 
strong emphasis on shareholders welfare. There are yet other sides to the corporate 
governance subject, such as the stakeholder view, which calls for more attention and 
accountability to players other than the shareholders.  
In corporations, the shareholder delegates decision rights to the manager to act 
in the principal's best interests. This separation of ownership from control implies a loss 
of effective control by shareholders over managerial decisions. Partly as a result of this 
separation between the two parties, a system of corporate governance controls is 
implemented to assist in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders.  
A board of directors often plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their 
responsibility to endorse the organization’s strategy, develop directional policy, 
appoint, supervise and remunerate senior executives and to ensure accountability of the 
organization to its owners and authorities. 
All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, 
in the effective performance of the organization. Directors, workers and management 
receive salaries, benefits and reputation, while shareholders receive capital return. 
Customers receive goods and services; suppliers receive compensation for their goods 
or services. In return these individuals provide value in the form of natural, human, 
social and other forms of capital. 
Numerous corporate governance principles and codes have been developed in 
different countries and issued from stock exchanges, corporations, institutional 
investors, or associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the support of  
  13 
Finances - Accounting 
governments and international organizations. Commonly accepted principles of 
corporate governance include: 
  Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: organizations should 
respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those rights. They 
can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively communicating information 
that is understandable and accessible and encouraging shareholders to participate in 
general meetings.  
  Interests of other stakeholders: organizations should recognize that they 
have legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.  
  Role and responsibilities of the board: the board needs a range of skills and 
understanding to be able to deal with various business issues and have the ability to 
review and challenge management performance.  
  Integrity and ethical behavior: organizations should develop a code of 
conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision 
making.  
  Disclosure and transparency: organizations should clarify and make 
publicly known the roles and responsibilities of board and management to provide 
shareholders with a level of accountability. They should also implement procedures to 
independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company's financial reporting.  
Different governance systems articulate the corporate objective in different 
ways, depending on which of two primary concerns is taken as the main focus: societal 
expectation or ownership rights. 
Some nations focus on the need to satisfy societal expectations and, in 
particular, the interests of employees and other stakeholders (variously defined to 
include suppliers, creditors, tax authorities and the communities in which corporations 
operate). This view predominates in continental Europe (particularly Germany, France 
and The Netherlands) and in certain countries in Asia. 
Other countries emphasize the primacy of ownership and property rights, and 
focus the corporate objective on returning a profit to shareholders over the long term. 
Under this view, employees, suppliers and other creditors have contractual claims on 
the company. As owners with property rights, shareholders have a claim to whatever is 
left after all contractual claimants have been paid. Associated with the US, Canada, the 
UK and Australia, this view of the corporate governance objective is generally justified 
on the followings: 
• accountability to shareholders provides a single measurable objective that 
avoids the risk of diffusing the accountability of managers and directors. If managers 
and directors are accountable to a whole range of stakeholders, almost any action can be 
justified as in the interest of some group of stakeholders, and this gives managers and 
directors unfettered discretion; 
 • focusing on long-term shareholder value encourages investment capital to be 
put to the most efficient economic used from a market perspective and this should 
benefit society broadly. 
No matter what view of the corporate objective is taken, effective governance 
ensures that boards and managers are accountable for pursuing it. The role of corporate 
governance in making sure that board and management are accountable is of broad 
importance to society for a number of reasons. An effective corporate governance 
system:  
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- promotes the efficient use of resources both within the company and the larger 
economy. Debt and equity capital should flow to those corporations capable of 
investing it in the most efficient manner for the production of goods and services most 
in demand, and with the highest rate of return. In this regard, effective governance 
should help protect and grow scarce resources, therefore helping to ensure that societal 
needs are met. In addition, effective governance should make it more likely that 
managers who do not put scarce resources to efficient use, or who are incompetent or 
(at the extreme) corrupt, are replaced. 
- assists companies (and economies) in attracting lower-cost investment capital 
by improving both domestic and international investor confidence that assets will be 
used as agreed (whether that investment is in the form of debt or equity). Although 
managers need to have latitude for discretionary action if they are to innovate and drive 
the corporation to compete successfully, rules and procedures are needed to protect 
capital providers, including: independent monitoring of management; transparency as to 
corporate performance, ownership and control; participation in certain fundamental 
decisions by shareholders. 
- assists in making sure that the company is in compliance with the laws, 
regulations and expectations of society. Effective governance involves the board of 
directors ensuring legal compliance and making judgments about activities that, while 
technically lawful in the countries in which the company operates, may raise political, 
social or public relations concerns. 
- provides managers with oversight of their use of corporate assets. Corporate 
governance may not guarantee improved corporate performance at the individual 
company level, as there are too many other factors that impact on performance. But it 
should make it more likely for the company to respond rapidly to changes in business 
environment, crisis and the inevitable periods of decline. It should help guard against 
managerial complacency and keep managers focused on improving firm performance, 
making sure that they are replaced when they fail to do so. 
- is closely related to efforts to reduce corruption in business dealings. Although 
it may not prevent corruption, effective governance should make it more difficult for 
corrupt practices to develop and take root, and more likely that corrupt practices are 
discovered early and eliminated. Effective governance is a check on the power of the 
relatively few individuals within the corporation who control large amounts of other 
people’s money. 
Roles of Corporate Governance's Actors in Globalization 
The corporate governance is conceptualized broadly as the set of interests and 
practices undertaken by shareholders and stakeholders of the firm. The focus should be 
on how the main governance actors (employees, shareholders, the board of directors, 
top management teams, and government) behave towards the firm as representative of 
the different interests shaping firm strategy. These interests are not always aligned.  
Existing frameworks for globalization usually have three constructs: industry 
globalization drivers, global strategy elements and global organization factors. 
Government drivers are frequently included under industry aspects, but focus on inter-
country rules such as trade and foreign direct investment regimes. But these 
government drivers of globalization ignore intra-country rules in terms of governance.  
Corporate governance is likely to affect all aspects of global integration which 
can be grouped in the following categories:   
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- the elements of global strategy: global market participation, global products 
and services, global activity location, global marketing and global competitive moves;  
- the elements of global organization: global organization structure, global 
management processes, global human resources and global culture.  
Therefore it is important to know how corporate governance might affect global 
strategy and global organization, which in turn will shape the patterns of globalization 
and also, how particular aspects of corporate governance (as related to actors in 
corporate governance within an institutional context) affect globalization outcomes. 
It should be done a theoretical analysis to explain the logic that could predict 
how each corporate governance actor will behave towards global strategy and global 
organization that in turn will lead to a particular pattern of globalization mode.  
a) Employees 
The role of home country employees in corporate governance varies by 
country, as determined by the existing institutional arrangements.  
Employees can have different mechanisms for influencing firm governance, 
depending on the corporate governance regime in which they operate. Examples of 
employee voice are board representation, work councils, equity ownership, unions, 
consultation rights and rules on working conditions and job security. The capacity of 
employees’ to influence the firm will have important effects for the firm’s ability to 
undertake global strategy and organization.  
Regarding the strategy dimensions of global integration, a strong corporate 
governance role for employees should be favorable to global market participation, as 
this latter applies to the global expansion of sales and therefore should favor home 
employment rather than threaten it. 
Similarly, the strong involvement of labour in firm governance shapes the 
characteristics of global products and services. A successful global product strategy 
requires not just the right design but also the ability to manufacture to world-class 
standards. Companies based in countries that for whatever reason cannot produce to 
world-class standards will, therefore, find it hard to adopt a global product strategy. On 
the other hand, too much employee involvement can have deleterious effects on product 
or service quality.  
Conversely, employees having a strong position within the firm’s corporate 
governance should:  
-  make it harder for a corporation to relocate activities globally outside the 
home country;  
-  have a small negative effect on the use of global marketing, at the margin, 
strong home country employees may prefer marketing that retains national identity;  
-  make it harder for a corporation to make global competitive moves, as these 
often require sacrifice of home country position, resources, revenues or profits, and 
hence domestic jobs or working conditions. 
Regarding the effects on global organization, it would expect that employees 
having a strong corporate governance role will not favor any global strategy lever 
because they would contribute to either fewer home country jobs or to decrease the 
quality of home country jobs. For instance, the implementation of global human 
resource policies is likely to transplant jobs across different subsidiaries and to 
introduce efficiency policies that are likely to impoverish home country employment 
practices such as work organization or performance incentives. 
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b) Shareholders 
Shareholders of large public multinational corporations play differing roles in 
different countries. There can be differentiate the neutral shareholders and those with 
vested interests (partial). The neutral shareholders are the ones to concern to maximize 
profits and shareholder value. USA and the UK have mostly neutral shareholders, who 
are focused on maximization of shareholder value. 
Interested shareholders also care about other objectives, sometimes ahead of 
shareholder value. Employee shareholders nearly always have the partial interest of 
some bias against maximizing shareholder value in favor of employment levels, pay or 
conditions. The shareholders such as banks or institutional investors  are considered as 
partial interest shareholders, as they will have several interests at stake in addition to 
shareholder value maximization. In Japan, institutional shareholders hold maintenance 
of the overall network as a major objective. In Germany, institutional shareholders 
typically have close ties and loyalty to management. In all countries, state shareholders 
pursue additional objectives such as maintaining employment, national security, 
competitiveness and prestige. 
For short, neutrality or partiality is a function of several shareholder attributes: 
the typical roles in a country of institutional shareholders and of governmental 
shareholders, the prevalence of first versus second or later generation family 
shareholders, the extent of shareholdings by managers and lastly the degree of 
concentration that will allow the exercise of shareholder influence. Hence is important 
to use neutrality versus partiality of shareholder interests as the key defining 
characteristic of shareholder behavior that affects globalization, although partial 
shareholders will need some degree of concentrated ownership in order to exercise 
influence. 
It is expected that shareholders will manifest different positions regarding the 
five global strategy levers. First, most shareholders, whether neutral or partial, should 
be in favor of global market participation, as that usually helps rather than affect 
domestic interests such as higher firm revenues.  
Second, whether shareholders are neutral or partial probably has little effect on 
the ability of corporations to produce globally competitive products and services. For 
example, Japan and Germany produce on average the highest quality global products 
and have similar types of shareholder interests (large institutions that favor incumbent 
management and the status quo). France and Italy have relatively large shareholdings 
by partial government shareholders but are not as successful in producing global 
products except in some niche areas. The USA and UK have similar corporate 
governance in terms of having mostly neutral shareholders. But the USA has many 
more companies with successful global products while Britain has almost no global 
products left, but a significant number of globally competitive services (especially in 
finance, airlines and creative industries). 
Third, neutral shareholders should favor global relocation of activities if that is 
in the best interests of the company and ultimately shareholder value. Some types of 
partial shareholders may oppose global relocation; in particular, significant equity 
ownership by home country employees makes it difficult for companies to move jobs 
overseas. Many government shareholders also seek to protect domestic employment. 
Some family shareholders may also have sentimental or altruistic reasons for preserving 
domestic employment.   
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Fourth, partial shareholders should have a small negative effect on the use of 
global marketing. At the margin, some home country shareholders, such as employees 
and governments, may prefer marketing that retains national identity. Second and later 
generation family shareholders may also seek to preserve a company heritage that has a 
national identity.  
Finally, partial shareholders with home country interests, such as employees 
and governments, should make it harder for a company to make global competitive 
moves, as these often require sacrifice of home country position, resources, revenues or 
profits, and hence domestic jobs or working conditions. 
The existing literature provides little guidance on the relationship between 
shareholder interests and global organization. First, even partial shareholders with 
domestic interests should favor global organization structures so long as the home 
country is dominant. An exception is that state owners may favor country-based 
organization structures, or a domestic-international split in order to preserve home 
country jobs, investment, or influence. A change from national family ownership to 
foreign or neutral ownership can trigger reorganization toward a global structure. 
Second, partial shareholders should favor global management processes so long as the 
home country processes dominate. Third, some types of partial shareholders, especially 
employees, should make it harder for a company to have global human resource   
policies, as they will favor the employment and advancement of home country 
nationals. Finally, firms controlled by family shareholders and domestic employee 
shareholders may find it hard to create a global culture. 
c) Board of directors 
Boards of directors vary importantly in terms of their structure, composition 
and activeness. German boards have a dual structure, with a supervisory board above a 
management board. The supervisory board has various statutory duties, particularly the 
appointment of the members of the management board and supervision of their actions. 
In the UK, most boards adhere to the Cadbury Report’s recommendation of having a 
non-executive chairman; in the other countries, the roles of chief executive (CEO) and 
chairman are often combined, especially in the USA. Another aspect of board structure 
is the role of committees, which varies depending on the strategic leadership of the 
board.  
The composition of boards in major OECD countries varies by both custom and 
law. British boards have a high proportion, usually a majority, of corporate executives, 
with very few external directors. On the other hand, British chairmen are typically 
outsiders. In contrast, US boards mostly have a majority of outside directors, but the 
chairman is usually an insider, either a past or current chief executive. German 
supervisory boards are required to have employee representatives, their number and 
proportion depending on the size of the company. In the other countries, labour 
representation and participation in firm decision making is rare, except where they are 
significant shareholders. State owned firms also tend to have higher labour 
representation.  
Countries also vary in the extent to which major shareholders have board 
representation. In the USA and UK, large institutional shareholders have only very 
recently sought representation on boards. In contrast, in Germany, and France, it is the 
norm to have major shareholders, such as banks or institutional investors, sitting on the 
board. Boards with a majority of directors who represent shareholders are more likely  
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to globalize and they are less risk averse than boards dominated by nonshareholders 
because they will be less constrained by non-shareholder interests. 
Hence, such firms are more likely to favor globalization strategies, particularly 
global market participation and global activity location, even if they adversely affect 
stakeholders. Similarly, such firms are more likely to use global management processes 
because they will seek value-maximizing behavior more than preservation of 
traditional, country centered methods. 
The insider-outsider split probably has mixed effects on globalization. On the 
one hand, outsiders (unless they represent special interests) should be able to make the 
most neutral tradeoffs about the risks involved in globalization. Boards dominated by 
neutral outsiders should be less risk averse than boards dominated by insiders, because 
they do not have their shares or job security at stake. Outsider directors are more likely 
to favor globalization strategies, particularly global market participation and global 
activity location. On the other hand, insiders typically have motives of empire building 
and incentive pay to offset any inherent preference for the status quo. Hence, 
performance evaluation and reward are also critical. 
Globalization should be affected by boards having partial  members: 
representatives of employees, network partners, suppliers, customers, governments or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Partial boards will bias decisions away from 
pure profit and shareholder value maximization, and hence the optimal globalization 
strategy, in favor of their particular constituencies. The employee, government and 
NGO board representatives pose might prevent fully-fledged globalization in order to 
promote their own interests. In contrast, representation of major shareholders, provided 
they have neutral interests, should favor globalization. Generally speaking, the other 
things being equal, neutral boards will be more likely to favor the right globalization 
strategies. 
It seems that globalization strategies will be most facilitated by having boards 
that have neutral interests favoring shareholder value. 
d) Top management teams 
Top management teams vary across countries in terms of their mobility and 
their background. In general, we expect that top management teams comprising mobile, 
professional managers are more likely to globalize. The more important distinction is 
whether the top management team acts in a fiduciary as opposed to an autonomous 
basis.  
Top managers with lifetime employment in the firm are more likely to act as 
fiduciaries for stakeholder interests and be more conservative about globalization. 
Similarly, those top managers who view themselves as professional managers rather 
than as specialists in a function are also more likely to make the balanced assessments 
needed for globalization. It is expected that companies with mobile, professional top 
management team will favor all elements of global strategy and organization, and adopt 
the most aggressive globalization strategies. 
e) Governments 
Governments can intervene in a business in two main ways: 
- first, they set the general rules and regulatory regimes that apply to all 
companies in a country or all companies within a given category. These rules and 
regimes also typically distinguish between domestic and foreign firms, and between 
domestic activities and foreign activities. For example, there may be general rules about 
the export of jobs and the import of foreign labour, or about the closing of operations;  
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- second, governments may intervene in individual cases, such as whether to 
allow a particular company to be sold to a foreign buyer.  
Governments have many interests to motivate their behavior. In the case of 
globalization, the two most important interests are probably the enhancement of 
national competitiveness and the preservation of employment. Both interests are likely 
to conflict with corporations’ free pursuit of globalization, especially in the short term. 
In general, corporations seek to ignore country considerations if at all possible in their 
globalization decisions, while national governments will inherently seek to intervene in 
favor of their country.  
Countries differ in the degree to which their governments intervene in the 
affairs of corporations, for ideological, political and legal reasons.  
The relationship between interventionist governments and global strategy is 
also important. Interventionist governments are more likely to encourage global market 
participation so long as jobs are not exported. 
They will also prefer exports as the mode of market participation rather than the 
setting up of overseas subsidiaries. They should in theory favor the development of 
globally successful products and services. In practice, protection often, but corporations 
to locate activities globally outside the home country, usually to preserve employment. 
Even liberal governments, such as that of the USA, can discourage some global 
relocation. Although they will probably be neutral as to whether domestic corporations 
use global as opposed to national marketing, such governments may have a slight 
preference for preserving aspects of national identity. Interventionist governments 
should make it harder  for a corporation to make global competitive moves, as these 
often require sacrifice of home country position, resources, revenues or profits, and 
hence domestic jobs or working conditions. 
As for the relationship between interventionist government and global 
organization, protectionist governments should:  
- favor global organization structures so long as the home country is dominant;  
- favor global management processes so long as the home country processes 
dominate;  
- make it harder for a corporation to have global human resources policies, as 
they will favor the employment and advancement of home country nationals;  
- make it harder for a corporation to implement a global, rather than home 
country, culture. 
Conclusion 
The above analysis underlines that strong roles for each corporate governance's 
actor predict particular globalization models. Besides, in order to understand corporate 
behavior such as globalization strategies, it is necessary to comprehend the dynamics of 
the different actors related to the firm: employees, shareholders, the board of directors, 
top management teams, and government.  
When firms need to grow, managers have different diversification choices. If 
they choose to tap into other markets through geographical diversification, then they 
should be aware of the actor-centered institutional factors that will determine their 
globalization decisions. Understanding the institutional environment within which firms 
operate at the national level will allow managers to align the different actors’ interests 
and capabilities with their own firms’ globalization modes.  
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To a large extent the corporation’s behavior was described as favoring 
globalization – risk taking, willingness to change, long-term maximization of profits 
and shareholder value and neutrality toward domestic national interests – is also the 
same as that favoring the long-term health and competitiveness of a nation’s companies. 
Hence the national corporate governance systems that favor globalization also favor 
long-term corporate competitiveness. 
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